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LEOLA WASHINGTON, Respondent, v. GEORGE 
WASHINGTON, Appellant. 
[1J Husband and Wife-Actions Against Third Persons-For Per-
sonal Injuries to Spouse.-An injured spouse's cause of action 
for personal injuries differs from ordinary community property 
in that the entire cause of action survives to him or her on 
the other spouse's death. 
[2J ld.-Actions Against Third Persons-For Personal Injuries to 
Spouse.-Civ. Code, § 956, providing that certain actions shall 
not abate on the death of one or another of the parties, does 
not affect a surviving spouse's interest in his or her cause of 
action for his or her own injuries. 
[8] ld.-Actions Against Third Persons-For Personal Injuries to 
Spouse.-A spouse's entire cause of action for his or her own 
personal injuries vests by operation of law in such spouse 
when the marriage is dissolved by divorce; and this does not 
violate the rule that such actions do not fully survive or the 
rule that they are not Rssignable. (Civ. Code, § 956.) 
[4] ld.-Actions Against Third Persons-For Personal Injuries to 
Spouse.-In the absence of a rule permitting the apportionment 
[1] See Cal.J'ur.2d, Husband and Wife, § 92 et seq. 
Melt. Dig. Reference: [1-5] Husband and Wife, § 185(1). 
:) 
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of the elements of a spouse's cause of action for personal 
injuries between the spouses' separate and community inter-
ests, treating the entire cause of action as community property 
protects the community interest in the elements that clearly 
ahQuld belong to it, and though such a rule may be justified 
when it appears that the marriage will continue, it loses its 
force when the marriage is dissolved after the cause of action 
accrues, since in such a case not only may the personal ele-
ments of damages such as past pain and suffering be reasonably 
treated as belonging to the injured party, but the damages for 
future pain and suffering, future expenses and future loss of 
earnings are attributable to him as a single person following 
the divorce. 
[lil Id.-Actions Against Third Persons-For Personal Injuries to 
Spouse.-Where no judgment in a husband's action for personal 
injuries against a municipality and the driver of a police car 
was entered against the municipality until after entry of a 
final divorce decree, and the judgment against the driver did 
not become final until after that time, the divorced wife 
acquired no interest in either judgment, since the cause of 
action against the municipality was not assignable and the 
judgment against the driver could not be assigned until it 
became final, and the entire cause of action vested in the 
injured husband on dissolution of the marriage. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the 
City and County of San Francisco. George W. Schonfeld, 
Judge. Reversed. 
Action for declaratory relief and partition. Judgment for 
plaintiff reversed. 
Edward D. Mabson for Appellant. 
Carl B. l\{etoyer, Terry A. Francois and l\{urvIDe C. Abels 
for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiit and defendant were married in 
October, 1944, and separated in August, 1946. There was one 
child of the marriage. In October, 1946, plaintiff filed an 
action for divorce on the grounds of extreme cruelty, and 
defendant answered putting the existing property rights of 
the parties in issue. In September, 1948, defendant lost a 
leg as a result of a eollision between a San Francisco poliee 
car and a car driven by Mervin E. Garner. He filed an 
action against the city and county of San Francisco and 
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Garner, and in December, 1950, the jury returned a verdict 
against both defendants for $85,000. Judgment was entered on 
the verdict against Garner, but the trial court granted the 
city and county's motion for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict. The judgment against Garner became final in August, 
1951, after he dismissed his appeal. The judgment in favor 
of the city and county was reversed on appeal with directions 
to enter judgment on the verdict. The city and county then 
moved for a new trial, and following the denial of its motion, 
appealed from the judgment, which was affirmed and became 
final in April, 1954. In the meantime, the divorce action was 
brought to trial, and an interlocutory decree in favor of plain-
tiff was entered in March, 1950. No supplemental pleadings 
were filed putting in issue the parties' rights in the cause 
of action for deiendant's personal injuries, and no disposition 
of property rights was made in the interlocutory decree and 
no alimony or child support was awarded.1 The custody of 
the minor daughter of the parties was awarded to plaintiff. A 
final decree of divorce was entered in May, 1951, and plaintiff 
remarried in November, 1952. After the judgment against 
the city and county became final in 1954, plaintiff brought 
this action for declaratory relief and partition asserting the 
right to half of defendant's recovery. Deductions were made 
for attorneys' fees and costs advanced by them, and judgment 
was entered in favor of plaintiff for $34,087.11, half the 
remainder, plus costs and interest. Defendant appeals. 
[1] In Kesler v. Pabst, 43 Ca1.2d 254, 258 [273 P.2d 257], 
we pointed out that although a wife's cause of action for 
personal injuries is community property, it differs from ordi- . 
nary community property in that on her husband's death the 
entire cause of action survives to her by operation of law. 
He "cannot, either by exercising or failing to exercise his 
power of testamentary disposition over half of the community 
property, affect his wife's rights in her cause of action." 
Although the Kesler case was concerned with the wife's cause 
of action for her injuries, there is no reason to treat the 
husband's cause of action for his injuries differently. As 
pointed out in the Kesler ease, the reason the wife's entire 
cause of action survived to her was to prevent her lOBS of 
full recovery for her injury by the abatement of her husband's 
interest in her cause of action on his death. (Moody v. 
aIt appears that the community property referred to in the pleadings 
had been exhauBted before trial and that defendant was unable be· 
e&U8e of hiI injury to earn money to p~ alimony or ohild Apport. 
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Southern Pac. 00., 167 Cal. 786, 790·791 [141 P. 388J) For 
the same reason the husband's entire cause of action for his 
injuries survives to him on his wife's death. [2) It is true 
that in 1949 the Legislature enacted section 9562 of the Civil 
Code providing for the survival of causes of action for personal 
injuries, and it may be contended that it is no longer necessary 
for the entire cause of action to survive to the injured spouse 
to prevent its partial abatement on the death of the other. 
To interpret section 956 as changing the rule of the Moody case, 
however, would require reading into it words that are not 
there. As here relevant that section provides that certain 
actions shall not abate on the death of one or another of the 
parties, but it contains no provisions affecting causes of action 
that would not otherwise abate on such a death. Accordingly, 
since under the rule of the Moody case, an injured spouse's 
cause of action has never abated in whole or in part on the 
death of the other spouse, section 956 does not affect the 
surviving spouse's interest in his or her cause of action for 
his or her own injuries. 
(3) In the present case the marriage was dissolved by 
divorce rather than death, and the question presented is 
whether a cause of action for personal injuries vests by opera-
tion of law in the injured party when the marriage is dis-
solved by divorce. We have concluded that just as the rule 
that personal actions abated on the death of the plaintiff 
compelled treating a spouse's cause of action for personal 
injuries differently from other community property in its 
devolution on the death of the other spouse, the rule pro-
hibiting the assignment of such a cause of action compels 
the same disposition of the cause of action when the marriage 
is dissolved by divorce. (See Ohase v. Ohase, 72 Mass. (6 
Gray) 157,159.) It is significant in this respect that although 
the Legislature has provided for the survival of such causes 
"'A thing in action arising out of a wrong which results in physical 
injury to the person or out of a statute imposing liability for such 
injury shall not abate by reason of the death of the wrongdoer or 
any other person liable for damages for such injury, nor by reason 
of the death of the person injured or of any other person who owns 
any such thing in action. When the person entitled to maintain such 
an action dies before judgment, the damages recoverable for such in· 
jury shall be limited to loss of earnings and expenses sustained or 
incurred as a result of the injury by the deceased prior to his death, 
and shall not include damages for pain, suffering or disfigurement, 
nor punitive or exemplary damages, nor prospective profits or earn· 
ings after the date of death. The damages recovered shall form part 
of the estate of the deceased. Nothing in this article shall be construed 
.. maldna AU • thine in action assignable." 
) 
Oct. 1956] W ASmNGTON v. W ASmNGTON 
[47 C.2d 249; 302 P.2d 569J 
253 
of action, it has expressly retained the rule that they are not 
assignable. (Civ. Code, § 956.) Clearly the court in a divorce 
action could not exercise its power to assign the community 
property (e. g., by assigning all or a major share of a spouse's 
cause of action for personal injuries to the other in a case of 
adultery or extreme cruelty) over a cause of action for per-
sonal injuries without violating the foregoing rule. (See 
Civ. Code, § 146.) Moreover, it would be anomalous if such 
personal elements of damages as pain, suffering, and disfigure-
ment, which still abate on the death of the injured party (Civ. 
Code, § 956), should be assignable to the other spouse in the 
case of divorce. On the other hand, the rule by which the 
entire cause of action vests in the injured party on death or 
divorce does not violate the rule that such actions do not fully 
survive or the rule that they are not assignable. (Moody v. 
A~outhern Pac. Co., supra, 167 Cal. 786, 790-791; Kesler v. 
Pabst, supra, 43 Ca1.2d 254, 258.) 
It is not unfair to the uninjured spouse to terminate his 
or her interest in the other's cause of action for personal 
injuries on divorce. The rule that a spouse's cause of action 
for personal injuries is necessarily community property has 
been criticized on the ground that it fails to distinguish be-
tween damages that could reasonably be considered personal 
to the injured spouse such a'! those for pain, suffering, and 
disfigurement and damages properly belonging to the commu-
nity such as those for loss of earning power, past and future 
medical expenses incurred or to be incurred, and disability 
of the injured spouse directly to contribute to the community 
venture. (See 1 de Funiak, Principles of Community Prop-
ertY,225-230.) [4] A rule permitting apportionment of the 
damages as suggested, however, has never been adopted in this 
state, and in the absence thereof, treating the entire cause 
of action as community property protects the community 
interest in the elements that clearly should belong to it. (See 
2 Armstrong, California Family Law 1513.) Although such 
a rule may be justified when it appears that the marriage will 
continue, it loses its force when the marriage is dissolved after 
the cause of action accrues. In such a case not only may the 
personal elements of damages such as past pain and suffering 
be reasonably treated as belonging to the injured party, but 
the damages for future pain and suffering, future expenses, 
and future loss of earnings are clearly attributable to him as 
a Bingle person following the divorce. Moreover, 88 in any 
) 
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other case involving future earnings or other after acquired 
property, the wife's right, if any, to future support may be 
protected by an award of alimony. Since we have no rule 
permitting the apportionment of the elements of a cause of 
action for personal injuries between the spouses' separate and 
community interests and since such a cause of action is not 
assignable, it must vest in the injured party on the dissolution 
of the marriage. 
[6] In the present case no judgment was entered against 
the city and county until after the entry of the final decree 
of divorce, and the judgment against Garner did not become 
final until after that time. Accordingly, since the cause of 
action against the city and county was not assignable and 
the judgment against Garner could not be assigned until it 
became final (Pacific Gas &- Elec. Co. v. Nakano, 12 Ca1.2d 
711, 713-714 [87 P.2d 700, 121 A.L.R. 417] ; see 121 A.L.R. 
420), plaintiff acquired no interest in either judgment. 
The judgment is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., and McComb, J., con-
curred. 
CARTER, J.-I concur in the result reached in the ma-
jority opinion. 
I think it is clear, however, that this court now recognizes 
that its former opinions, holding that causes of action for 
personal injuries are community property, are unrealistic 
and outmoded. 
In Zaragosa v. Craven, 33 Ca1.2d 315 [202 P.2d 73, 6 A.L.R. 
2d 461], in which I dissented, it was held that CC ••• it must be 
considered as the present law of this state that the cause of 
action for personal injuries suffered by either spouse during 
marriage, to whatever extent such cause of action may con-
stitute property (see p. 725, Franklin v. Franklin, supra [67 
Cal.App.2d 717 (155 P.2d 637)]), as well as any recovery 
therefor, constitutes community property-at least in the 
absence of agreement otherwise between the spouses. Any 
contrary implications which may be derived from the lan-
guage of the Franklin case are disapproved." 
The accident here involved occurred after the plaintiff had 
sued for divorce, but before the interlocutory decree was 
entered. The parties were therefore still husband and wife 
despite the fact that the divorce action had been filed almost 
two years prior to the accident in which defendant was 
injured. 
) 
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I am of the opinion now, as I have always been, that a 
cause of action for personal injuries is a separate and personal 
one and that the recovery therefor should be the separate 
property of the injured spouse except for the actual loss to 
the community in the earning power of the injured spouse 
(see dissenting opinion in Zaragosa v. Craven, 33 Ca1.2d 315, 
323, 324 [202 P.2d 73, 6 A.L.R.2d 461]). As I have hereto-
fore pointed out in my dissents (Zaragosa v. Craven, supra; 
Flores v. Brown, 39 Ca1.2d 622, 633 [248 P.2d 922]; and 
Kesler v. Pabst, 43 Cal.2d 254, 260 [273 P.2d 257]) there is 
no reason whatsoever to characterize a cause of action for 
personal injuries a "community cause of action." The wife, 
or husband, has a right to sue in her, or his, own name (Code 
Civ. Proc., § 370; Sanderson v. Niernann, 17 Cal.2d 563, 567 
[110 P.2d 1025]) and the recovery therefor 'should be the 
individual's sole and separate property (de Funiak, Princi-
ples of Community Property, pp. 225, 232; 24 Cal.L.Rev. 
739; Rest., Torts, § 487). 
In Zaragosa v. Craven, supra, a majority of this court 
held that a cause of action for personal injuries which arose 
during the marriage relationship was community property 
(thereby overruling a contrary statement in Franklin v. 
Franklin, 67 Cal.App.2d 717 [155 P.2d 637]). In F'lores v. 
Brown, supra, Mr. Flores died as a result of the accident giving 
rise to Mrs. Flores' cause of action and, in order to avoid 
its former rule of imputation of contributory negligence, a 
majority of this court decided that even though the cause 
of action arose during marriage, that marriage was terminated 
by Mr. Flores' death at the time of the accident and therefore 
the entire cause of action devolved to Mrs. Flores and that 
the contributory negligence of Mr. Flores was not imputable 
to her. I pointed out in my dissent in Kesler v. Pabst, supra, 
that the holding in the Flores' case was quite inconsistent with 
the majority holding in the Zaragosa case. 
It has been said quite often and with a great deal of 
truth that "hard cases make bad law." 
In the instant case, a woman who has brought suit against 
her husband for divorce and who was separated from him, 
seeks to recover half of the compensation awarded him for 
an injury which took place while the marriage was still in 
being although after suit for divorce had been filed. If what 
was said in the Zaragosa case is still the law, the cause of 
action aooruing during the existence of the marital relation-
. ship. because of defendant's personal injuries, was community 
) 
) 
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property and any judgment recovered as a result thereof 
should relate back so as to take on the same character. 
In the case under consideration, however, in neither the 
original complaint for divorce, nor in the amended complaint, 
did Mrs. Washington allege the cause of action for Washing-
ton's personal injury to be community property and pray 
for a division thereof when the same had been reduced to 
final judgment . 
.AB Mr. de Funiak aptly said (Principles of Community 
Property, p. 225): "Their [courts] usual decision to con-
sider the property received in exchange for separate property 
as taking the character of separate property is a fortunate 
triumph of common sense over a lack of understanding of the 
principles of community property. But apparently the courts 
are inclined to apply a similar reasoning to the right of 
action for personal injuries and to the compensation received; 
that is, it is a property acquired during marriage and is not 
acquired by gift, etc., therefore it must be community prop-
erty. But this overlooks the principles of onerous and lucrative 
title~ and other pertinent principles. Except for gifts clearly 
made to the marital community, community property only 
consists of that which is acquired by onerous title, that is, 
by labor or industry of the spouses, or which is acquired in 
exchange for community property (which, of course, was 
acquired itself by onerous title, again with the exception 
as to the gift). It must be plainly evident that a right of 
action for injuries to person, reputation, property, or 
the like or the compensation received therefor, is not property 
acquired by onerous title. The labor and industry of the 
spouses did not bring it into being. For that matter it is 
not property acquired by lucrative title either. . . . Since the 
right of action for injury to the person . • • is intended to 
repair or make whole the injury, so far as is possible in such 
a case, the compensation partakes of the same character as that 
which has been injured or suffered loss." 
If this court would hold, logically and reasonably, once 
and for all that a cause of action for personal injuries was 
personal to the injured spouse and that the recovery consti-
tuted his, or her, separate property (see Civ. Code, § 171c, as 
it relates to the wife) then it would not be necessary to 
engage in legal acrobatics in a case such as this in order to 
reach a just result. I have no complaint with the statements 
in the majority opinion that the causes of action for the 
personal injuries to Mr. Washington were not assignable and 
) 
.) 
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t.hat no assignments thereof could be had until final judgments 
had been rendered therein. When this case and the Flores 
case are considered together, it appears to me that perhaps, in 
time, a majority of this court will recognize the fallacy in 
earlier holdings that a cause of action for personal injuries 
accruing during marriage is community property. 
I am happy to see a majority ·of the members of this court 
depart from the rule of the Zaragosa case which, if carried 
to its logical conclusion, would have prevented the conclusion 
reached in Flores v. Brown, supra, and the just result 
reached in the case under consideration. I am hopeful that 
in time the court will come to the full realization that a cause 
(If action for personal injuries and the compensation received 
therefor is personal to the injured person since such cause 
of action and compensation were always intended as a sub-
stitutefor the violation of a personal right. The majority 
opinion, however illogical in the light of the rule of the 
Zaragosa case, is a small step in the right direction. 
SHENK, J., Dissenting.-In no uncertain terms the Legis-
lature has classified property owned by spouses before mar-
riage and property acquired by them after marriage. Since 
,1872 section 162 of the Civil Code has provided that "All 
property of the wife owned by her before marriage, and that 
acquired afterwards by gift, bequest, devise, or descent, . . . 
is her separate property." And for a like period section 
163 of the same code has provided that, "All property owned 
by the husband before marriage, and that acquired afterward 
by gift, bequest, devise and descent, . . . is his separate prop-
erty. " Section 164 then and since has provided that, "All 
othel: property acquired after marriage by either husband or 
wife, or both .•. is community property." 
Without question the right of action acquired by the 
defendant was property. It was a chose in action and personal 
property as defined by section 14 of the Civil Code. (See also 
6 West's Anno.Cal. Code, p. 67, and cases cited in n. 15.) It 
was acquired during the marriage and lifetime of the spouses 
and before the entry of the interlocutory decree. That decree 
did not sever the marriage relationship. On the record here 
presented the cause of action and the fund derived therefrom 
continued to be community property. (Brown v. Brown, 170 
Cal. 1 [147 P. 1168].) Such a cause of action was held to be 
community property in Zara,gosa v. Oraven, 33 Cal.2d 315 
[202 P.2d 73, 6 A.L.R.2d 461], and that case cannot be dis-
4? C.2d ..... 
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tinguished from the case at bar. The property right here 
involved was either the separate property of the defendant or 
the community property of the spouses. It could not be both. 
The Legislature has so defined separate property as to exclude 
it from that category. The Legislature has also declared that 
all property not defined as separate property is community 
property. Now the court holds that all does not mean all, 
and declares in effect that the cause of action was not commu-
nity property. The statutory definitions include all property 
of whatever description own~d or acquired by the spouses. 
The fund here involved is certainly not included within the 
definition of separate property and is therefore community 
property. 
I can see no justification for setting at nought the decision 
in the Zaragosa case and other cases cited therein in support 
thereof. The District Court of Appeal of the First District, 
Division Two, affirmed the judgment in a well considered 
opinion authored by Mr. Justice Dooling and reported in 296 
P.2d 896. For the reasons stated in that opinion and on the 
authority of the Zaragosa and other cases to like effect, I 
would adhere to the plain language of the statute as heretofore 
applied by this court and affirm the judgment. 
